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Abstract
Approaches to risk analysis, crisis management and resilience enhancement for 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) Protection will be considered starting from a case study 
related to the management of the pandemic in Italy. Business continuity and crisis 
management models for CI are analyzed aiming to deal with complexity and reduce 
uncertainty relating pandemic and long-time crisis. Furthermore, is presented a 
methodology highlighting the functioning of the Italian Civil Protection and its 
systemic nature: a complex apparatus made up of different elements and organiza-
tions, which derives from the functioning of different organizational systems in 
interaction with each other. As a baseline for the coordination management the 
Augustus Method is considered for its strategical, tactical and operational aspects. 
One of the main outputs of the research consists in creating a “what if” forecasting 
model, configured as a visualization of the propagation of negative effects on the 
supply chain and manpower over time.
Keywords: complex system, emergency management, manpower, cascading effects, 
resilience
1. Introduction
Dealing with complexity and reducing uncertainty during 2020 crisis is a 
 priority, for Countries, Critical Infrastructures, and companies.
Due to the interdependency of Critical Infrastructures, companies, and the civil 
society their protection and management represent a significant challenge and, 
somehow, an opportunity.
The present contribution aims to support the understanding of the tangled 
pandemic scenario, studying the interdependencies between different sectors and 
their supply chain, proposing a model addressed to the complexity management for 
ensure the Business Continuity both of Critical Infrastructure and companies.
The Italian response to the crisis generated by the pandemic was observed, from 
the study of the impact of the crisis on Critical Infrastructures, to the response 
strategies, the remediation plans, passing through the reference standards on 
 business continuity and supply chain (in the ISO family of standards).
The imposed lockdown has led to a forced acceleration of digitization, with the 
challenges and opportunities that could be derived from it.
The crisis management, supported by the experience generated by the avian 
influenza, together with the support tools provided by the Italian government has 
proved to be effective and efficient, also relaunching several SMEs through their 
productive conversion.
Issues on Risk Analysis for Critical Infrastructure Protection
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The human factor has become evident as the cornerstone of any service, from 
the provision of essential services falling within the competence of the Critical 
Infrastructures, which have involved a particular attention to the continuous secu-
rity and business protocols to be followed, to the most disparate production sectors. 
It is also necessary to remember how the interconnection between the different 
sectors and services now characterizes our reality, and therefore how the so call 
“What-If Analysis” s fundamental in the development of decision support tools for 
crisis management. In this context is clear that resilience is founded on risk analysis 
and the drawing of recovery plans, together with measures for an increased control 
over the value chain.
2.  Addressing complexity and impacts of pandemic in critical 
infrastructure
Dealing with complexity and reducing uncertainty during 2020 crisis is a 
 priority for Countries, Critical Infrastructures, and companies.
Complexity could represent a risk but also an opportunity to create a new 
competitive advantage.
Society is dependent on composed critical networks, becoming more complex as 
are strong interdependent both within and between infrastructure systems [1].
Nowadays, complexity and uncertainty assess the search for new and effective 
management strategies and methods. Embracing unpredictability and planning 
to adapt is crucial to manage the complexity that cannot be eliminated, although, 
it can be reduced to manageable levels. Complexity and vulnerability of Critical 
Infrastructure systems has been explored and assessed [2, 3].
Complexity is related with composite systems and problems that are dynamic, 
unpredictable, and multi-dimensional. It consists of a collection of interconnected 
relationships and parts. Unlike traditional “cause and effect” or linear thinking, 
complexity science is characterized by nonlinearity [4]. Complexity management 
needs to consider several layouts of complexity, in fact an IC or a company internal 
value chain is strongly dependent on external complexity.
For each area of complexity regulation, as avoidance and reduction related to 
causes, transfer, and division, exist several theories, approaches and methods.
Effective complexity management aim to develop an appropriate and effective 
incident response plan. Finally, complexity must be addressed proactively.
In fact, in such complex scenario, different actors (institutional and non) 
have responded to the crisis in multiple ways, according to the regulations issued. 
Moreover, these troubled times show how strategic and essential are some sectors.
In the crisis generated by the pandemic it has been confirmed that the daily 
life of the citizens depends on the reliability of the Critical Infrastructures (CI) 
to supply essential services such as energy and water. In recent years, Critical 
Infrastructure control systems have become more complex, with increasingly inter-
connected devices; a trend that will probably continue with the Internet of Things.
The need for increased resilience to resist extreme events of both natural and 
malicious origin has become more acute. With Critical Infrastructure continuously 
exposed to threats, especially cyber-attacks, there are severe security implications, 
most notably in the energy sector which is ranked as one of the most affected 
sectors with the highest incident costs [5]. Any attack of this nature is likely to have 
knock-on effects on a country’s overall economy and the lives of its citizens.
The pandemic, all in all, has had modest effects on the electrical service. 
Electricity consumption has been reduced by about 10% on average, but with a very 
uneven distribution on the Italian territory. Fortunately, the phenomenon has been 
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well controlled and there have been no perceptible effects, but it is easy to imagine 
the consequences of possible inefficiencies. The effect of the pandemic could be 
very marked on geopolitical balances, in a context of possible tensions deriving 
from the rebalancing of the primary energy market and the challenge of the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution (4IR) [6].
The energy issue brings us back to the more general field of critical infrastruc-
tures: electricity and energy system, communication networks, infrastructures for 
the transport of people and goods (air, sea, rail and road), health system, economic-
financial circuits, administrative and state organizations and bodies.
What happened on the Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (the Italian 
Social Security), website is a symptom of a strong criticality in the Country System, 
where technical shortcomings make the fundamental rights of citizens even more 
vulnerable, and how IC and companies must equip themselves to manage crisis 
situations that are not predictable. For this reason there have been several episodes 
in Italy which have triggered the alarm by the Centro Nazionale Anticrimine 
Informatico per la Protezione delle Infrastrutture Critiche (CNAIPIC - National 
Anti-Crime Information Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures).
In terms of crisis management, thanks to the experience of avian influenza 
(H5N1), which has highlighted how the human factor is the most valuable element 
for any company and as such must be safeguarded and protected, operators of 
critical infrastructure have been able to develop a series of effective initiatives, as 
demonstrated by the fact that no essential service, i.e. the supply of gas, water, elec-
tricity, transport, etc. has suffered interruptions or dysfunctions in recent months. 
And this despite the problems related to difficulties in supply, reduced mobility, 
the presence of staff in quarantine fiduciary and/or infected and considering the 
commitment of companies to safeguard the health of their workers.
This achievement is the result of an effort which in recent years has seen a 
significant change in the role of the security managers, which has shifted to the 
top management in order to bring strategic choices back to specific task forces 
capable of having a prompt impact on all levels of the company’s organization, 
being equipped with the financial and decision-making capacity appropriate to the 
criticality of the situation [7].
2020 long time crisis and consequent lock down were managed asking to every 
operators of critical services to maintain business continuity and to guarantee 
services if critical. This means that not only critical infrastructures at national level, 
but also critical infrastructures at regional or city or province level had to maintain 
operation, even having the supply chains partly or completely locked and also even 
having manpower partly or completely in smart working.
The Office of the Military Advisor of the Presidency of the Council, in 
 consideration of the necessity to guarantee the essential services provided by 
Critical Infrastructures, has provided the precautionary principles, to which 
Critical Infrastructure Operators are required to comply in order to contain and 
contrast the spread of the pandemic, while ensuring the continuity of the supply of 
essential services, the operability of the facilities and the security of the personnel 
involved.
These lines suggest, first, a reduction in the number of staff working in situ by 
reducing activities to those that cannot be postponed for business continuity, and to 
review the maintenance programs, limiting them to those that cannot be postponed 
and postponing those that are not indispensable, promoting the adoption of smart 
working at all levels, necessary for the continuity of the service. The Precautionary 
Principles highlight the need to provide specific training and tools to operators 
to prevent and combat the threat of cybersecurity, the importance of which is 
 growing today, to equipping all staff with adequate IT support, including the use of 
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dedicated connections, VPN systems and anything else in order to ensure adequate 
levels of cybersecurity, including the issue of appropriate rules of conduct by staff 
working in smart working mode.
Furthermore, is required to prepare all the necessary measures related to 
sanitization.
The Companies are invited to organize the personnel involved in activities that 
cannot be postponed at the work sites or field operations in teams composed of 
the minimum number of people necessary for the safe execution of the various 
activities. The composition of each team, to increase its resilience, must not, where 
possible, change over time and specific procedural measures must be taken to avoid, 
or limit to a minimum, physical interaction between several teams.
With regard to the management of the control and management rooms, given that 
it is necessary to ensure their functionality in all conditions, it is recommended that 
all useful measures be taken to contain the pandemic; organizing the staff into several 
teams and adopting specific and more stringent safeguards for this type of personnel, 
for example, measures and/or adequately equipping several rooms, possibly in differ-
ent locations, to allow the alternation of shifts in different rooms and/or sanitized each 
shift change [8]. Another taken measure was the “voluntary segregation”: the provision 
of temporary accommodation for groups of people who will operate in the control 
center for a period of not less than 14 days without physical contact with external per-
sonnel. The spaces to which such staff have access will be forbidden to those who do not 
implement voluntary segregation. To guarantee the continuous rotation of the activi-
ties, a second team of staff is set up at the same time, already in isolation at their homes.
Telespazio has set up a three-level system for its Space Center which, before 
entering the control room, requires a further period of voluntary quarantine within 
a camp facility located at the Fucino site [9].
The theme of cyber-security is particularly relevant in an increasingly intercon-
nected world where threat vectors multiply and can affect the vulnerabilities of 
Critical Infrastructures. Moreover, the low level of cybersecurity preparedness of 
the country system is also reflected in low awareness among citizen-users.
In view of the above, we can say that for the management of emergencies and 
crises first of all it is necessary to develop a culture of security, supported by the nec-
essary tools and strategies, also considering that we are moving towards the increas-
ing digitalization of any area of the country. In order to do this we can combine the 
creation of high potential and distributed networks, to avoid in case of stress of 
infrastructure use, domino effects. It is not possible today to imagine an area of the 
country that is not covered by essential infrastructures and services that respond to 
adequate minimum levels of service delivery and security, especially cybersecurity.
It is therefore also essential to start a training process in line with the needs of 
the world of work and thus adapt to the new professions, together with a plan for 
the conversion of skills towards new professional qualifications [10].
A fundamental and new aspect of this crisis, which has led to a rethinking of the 
management of Critical Infrastructures, is that there was a clear “ day before” (in 
Italy between 10th and 11st March) and a lack of clarity in the “day after”. There is 
still the sensation of a prolonged crisis and the passage to a remote working that has 
reduced social relations. This situation has also led to a discontinuity in the visibility 
that the employer has towards his employees (with respect to how he is and what he 
feels) that had never been experienced before, while the knowledge of the human 
model is crucial.
When we make a reading of complexity, we consider a company (or a CI) and 
analyze it in all that is the flow of its value chain and we retrace all the places and 
moments of a not physiological complexity.
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One type of challenge for Critical Infrastructure Protection is about the 
 dependencies and interdependencies among different Critical Infrastructures [11].
In the context of this extremely long lock-down we had an enormous complex-
ity of relations with suppliers and with those who had to remain in continuity and 
we would find in the re-opening a strong discontinuity, also in understanding for 
example the rules with which it was possible to re-open and the responsibilities (in 
fact, the provision of a suitable team that knows how to interpret the rules is also 
part of crisis management).
2.1  The Italian production strategy during the 2020 pandemic: statal measures 
and production conversion
Italian SMEs have worked out an appropriate response strategy to the crisis 
caused by the 2020 pandemic.
Starting from the importance of the role of each individual entrepreneur, 
through the constant and daily collection of information on a formal and  informal 
basis, it was possible to identify the strategic levers and focus on new core 
 businesses, based on corporate liquidity, assets and resources.
It emerged that the creation of balanced strategic levers, the make/buy balance, 
together with the dialog with the stakeholders represented a fundamental element 
for the conception of a response strategy that represented an example of business 
resilience.
The crisis has certainly been, and still is, an opportunity to examine which 
 lessons are learning for the future creation of resilience-oriented protocols [12].
There are many Italian companies that have reacted to the crisis by reconverting 
their production.
Phase two, co-existence with the pandemic, began on 4th May 2020. The 
Prime Minister’s Decree issued by the Government has made mandatory the use 
of the mask in closed places accessible to the public, such as public transport and 
shops. Wearing the mask is mandatory in all situations where “it is not possible to 
 continuously guarantee a safe distance” [13].
Given the emergency and lack of access to this personal protective equipment, 
more and more companies have chosen to make a concrete contribution and boost 
their activities after the lockdown by aiming at the reconversion of production 
chains to manufacture masks. Initiatives that are born to make available the exper-
tise and skills of entire sectors forced by the emergency and the upheaval of daily 
habits to rebuild their missions and restructure their short, medium- and long-term 
objectives.
Siare Engineering, an Emilian company specialized in the manufacture of 
lung ventilators (the unique company in Italy), at the outbreak of the emergency 
increased its production and changed its export market. In mid-March the company 
delivered 300 machines to the Civil Protection, originally destined for countries 
such as South Korea, India, the Philippines and Vietnam, its traditional clients. The 
company was supported by specialized Army technicians with the aim of produc-
ing over 2300 machines, tripling production. Siare Engineering’s efforts were 
 supported by companies such as Ferrari, FCA and Magneti Marelli [14].
Grafica Veneta, a Paduan company active in the printing sector, has reconverted 
its production to produce 2 million masks. These products, even though they could 
not be intended for healthcare workers, provided (at a time of dramatic  shortage) 
an initial protection to the population, and were distributed free of charge to 
the population by the Civil Protection and the Alpini (Italian Army’s mountain 
infantry).
Issues on Risk Analysis for Critical Infrastructure Protection
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Mestel Safety, a specialist in snorkeling and diving masks, deposited a patent at 
the beginning of March to transform this diving equipment into protective masks 
against contagion [15].
On 23rd March Confindustria Moda launched an adhesion campaign to make 
masks and PPE, to which 200 companies have immediately joined. A similar initia-
tive was taken by CNA Federmoda. Some of the most important Italian fashion 
companies responded to the call, such as Armani, Calzedonia, Fendi, Gucci and 
Valentino.
Prada, on request of the Tuscany Region, has started the production of 80,000 
white coats and 110,000 masks [16].
Toscano Alta Sartoria (ex Mabro) has promptly reconfigured its production 
starting, from March, to produce 3000–4000 masks per day [17].
A choice made also by Valigeria Roncato, a leading company in the sector in the 
production of luggage made in Italy, which has decided to make a strong contribu-
tion to the enduring battle at pandemic by converting its production lines for the 
production of long-lasting, non-disposable, washable and therefore reusable masks 
[18]. The core business of the Veneto industry responds to the urgent demand for 
protective masks that are becoming more and more indispensable.
These solidarity initiatives have been stimulated by the possibility to access 
incentives to activate the production and supply of medical devices and personal 
protective equipment (PPE) for the containment and fight against the epidemio-
logical emergency.
And more: to deal with the pandemic, numerous measures have been taken to 
prevent and contain its expansion and its effects on the economic system. These 
are emergency measures issued at short distance from each other and linked to 
each other.
The financial support to SMEs has gone through interventions on the fiscal 
side, the suspension of the refund of loans, the public guarantee on those granted 
to companies that have suffered decreases in turnover, a fund for the promotion of 
Made in Italy, financing.
The objective was to prevent SMEs from shutting down due to lack of liquidity 
because of the emergency: according to Cerved the system could lose up to  
650 billion in revenue between this year and the next.
In this picture, are extremely important the interventions to support the liquid-
ity of the productive network, strongly strengthened by the Legislative Decree n. 
23/2020 (so-called Liquidity Decree). This last measure has on one hand modified 
and on the other hand implemented the extraordinary measures introduced by 
Decree Law no. 18/2020. This is also thanks to the new regulatory framework for 
State aid, the EU Commission’s “State Aid Temporary Framework” [19], which has 
intervened in the meantime. On 14th April 2020, the European Commission autho-
rized the extraordinary support aid schemes provided by Decree Law no. 23/2020. 
Further interventions to support the liquidity of companies are also contained in 
Decree-Law No 34 of the 2020.
The economic support measures for businesses adopted with the decrees 
of March–May 2020 (Decree-Law No 18/2020, Decree-Law No 23/2020 and 
Decree-Law No 34/2020) are essentially attributable to the following main lines of 
intervention: liquidity support; export and internationalization support; capital-
ization support and non-repayable grants; suspension of certain obligations and 
tax payments, as well as temporary relief on the fixed costs of electricity bills for 
low-voltage non-domestic users; interventions for companies in crisis, industrial 
reconversion and development contracts; protection of the national economic and 
business fabric through changes, some of which are temporary, to the exercise of 
special powers in sectors of strategic importance (so-called golden power).
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Among the measures for companies in crisis, industrial reconversion and 
 development contracts, the following interventions are highly important.
Decree Law No. 18/2020 refinanced the measure of development contracts 
by €400 million for 2020 (Article 80). The Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico 
(MISE) Directive of April 15th, 2020 provided for the allocation of resources.
Finally, it should be noted that Law Decree no. 18/2020 authorized the 
Extraordinary Commissioner for the Epidemiological Emergency to provide fund-
ing to companies producing medical devices and personal protective equipment, 
using INVITALIA as the entity managing the measure. To this end, expenditure 
of EUR 50 million for 2020 has been authorized (Article 5). The aid scheme was 
authorized by the EU Commission (on 22nd March 2020). The Ordinance of the 
Extraordinary Commissioner of 23rd March 2020 (published in the Official Journal 
on 24 March 2020) implemented the measure.
The resources were assigned to the granting of aid to investment programs 
aimed at increasing the availability of medical devices and personal protection 
equipment in the national territory through the expansion of the capacity and/or 
the reconversion of an existing production unit. The facilities consist of subsidized 
financing of up to 75% of eligible expenditure. The maximum amount of the 
facilities that can be granted, in terms of aid (intended as Gross Grant Equivalent), 
may not exceed 800,000 euros, in accordance with the European Commission 
Communication of 19th March 2020 - COM (2020) 1863 final - “Temporary 
Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 
outbreak”.
Manufacturing masks, gowns, gels and disinfection products, plexiglass  spacers, 
medical devices. These are some of the production reconversions following the 
pandemic of companies in most of the textile-fashion sector, but also plastics, 
chemicals, cosmetics, manufacturing, medical, graphics and printing [20].
For some sectors, textiles and chemicals, the new production is opening stable 
business opportunities in the post 2020 long time crisis, through new channels, 
which also open opportunities for professional integration.
More than two thirds of companies in the chemical sector, which in the emer-
gency produced alcohol-based disinfectant gels for the hospital sector, are planning 
to permanently convert, but now intend to extend to direct sales to consumers.
And two thirds of the companies in the plastics sector, which have taken the 
opportunity to make plexiglass spacers to be installed in the companies, will not 
stop production. By virtue of a demand that is still expected to be sustained, 
moreover, more than half of the companies in the textile sector, which are now also 
aiming to create joint ventures with fashion companies, and almost all the compa-
nies in the print sector, which have activated new channels, will maintain active 
production of masks.
Not all companies, however, are planning to maintain the conversion once 
the normality is restored, with profound differences between sectors, due to the 
specificities of the productions.
These are mainly temporary reconversions, on the other hand, for fashion 
companies that have turned for a few weeks to the production of masks and gowns, 
as for those in the automotive, cosmetics, medical devices, and manufacturing 
sectors.
In addition to interventions aimed solely at conversion, the whole world of 
work has had to face the need to change and adapt to the new situation. Another 
example of resilience, together with the reconversion of the production of different 
 companies, was the adoption of smart working.
There are data on the transition to remote working collected by Associazione 
Italiana Esperti Infrastrutture Critiche (AIIC) with the help of other companies. 
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It became clear that before the crisis and therefore until 2019 in companies 71% 
of employees did not even know what remote working was. During the pandemic 
97% of people said they had been working remotely all the time and 43% of people 
interviewed said they would continue to work remotely.
Regarding the impact on the IT budget: 30% of companies said that investments 
on the 2020 roadmap projects reset and/or moved to 2021 or suspended.
In contrast, 30% of companies stated that investments will continue without any 
impact on the 2020 roadmap projects.
Finally, 60% of companies say they still do not know how to proceed with the 
investments.
The company management, however, has the advantage of being able to pro-
vide incentives for sanitization and safety at work: for companies are introduced 
incentives for sanitization and increased safety at work, through the granting of a 
tax credit equal to 50% of expenses up to a maximum of 20 thousand euros, and 
contributions through the establishment of an Inail fund.
The pandemic emergency has not only produced a strong acceleration of digital 
transformation, smart working and strong demands related to logistics, but also 
interesting productive reconversions, together with the consciousness of the com-
plex interrelation through different sectors and their supply chain.
For SMEs, the introduction of new products has often meant a real revolution in 
the business, but able to ensure continuity in production that would otherwise have 
stopped. Moreover, in case the reconversions are expected to be permanent, are 
requiring new professional figures to support the activity.
And, most of all, the emergency confirmed the relevance of the human factor.
3. Concrete approaches to critical infrastructure protection
3.1  Supply chain continuity management and lack of manpower during the 
pandemic
Supply Chain Continuity Management (SCCM) must be considered as a 
necessary evolution of Business Continuity Management (BCM) models. SCCM 
is outlined in the ISO 22318 standard which is part of the group of standards for 
continuity management including ISO 22301, ISO 22313 Security and resilience 
(ISO 22318), and ISO 28000, which specifies the requirements for a security 
management system, including those aspects critical to security assurance of 
the supply chain. SCCM defines continuity in relation to external supplies, 
third parties or internal entities that play a supplier role in the context of the 
organization.
The simplified representation of the supply chain therefore provides a composite 
structure of internal and external suppliers (considering also the flexibility appli-
cable to the relationships between the suppliers) that contribute to the operations of 
an organization and consequently of its customers.
If the relationship with suppliers is characterized by assets that are mainly 
intangible and movable and therefore related, for example, to the exchange of 
information or movable consumer goods, there will be greater control. An example 
in this sense, during the pandemic emergency management consisted in the pos-
sibility of maintaining relationships with suppliers through forms of smart work-
ing. This form of collaboration and coordination has been possible mainly between 
entities operating in sectors consisting of intangible assets such as professional, 
scientific and technical activities, financial and insurance activities, the activities 
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of extraterritorial organizations, public administration and most professional 
services and, in general, all sectors that have not been affected by the suspension 
decrees.
In any case it will be necessary to have a management plan in case of crisis or 
incidents involving the supply chain.
The adoption of such measures will result in increasing control over the value 
chain in relation to an organization. In particular, the analysis carried out on 
the supply chain gives visibility to the mapping of interdependencies between 
different sectors allowing an analysis that goes beyond the single organization. 
Network analysis techniques could be combined with criticality and reliability 
metrics in order to produce composite methods that provide useful information to 
 stakeholders [21].
As for ISO 22301, to plan the SCCM it will be necessary to carry out Impact 
Analysis activities with the individual suppliers involved, distinguishing critical 
suppliers from non-critical suppliers. For all relationships with critical sup-
pliers, the guarantee of continuity can be determined by identifying a SCCM 
strategy to be agreed in transparency with these suppliers. Some strategic 
approaches may be:
• Reducing dependence on a supplier: direct engagement of substitute suppliers 
for a specific service; increasing on-site stock holding; establishing alternative 
solutions.
• Increasing resilience: loss mitigation; establishing mutual support policies with 
competitors.
• Working with suppliers: creating partnerships with suppliers; setting per-
formance standard; monitoring and dealing with suppliers to increase their 
resilience; including SCCM requirements in supplier contracts.
The direct effects of the suspension decrees concerned the sectors directly 
involved and all those sectors that had to sustain the labor shortage caused by the 
lockdown. While other sectors not directly involved in the suspension decrees, such 
as financial services or wholesale trade, or sectors more prone to targeted recon-
versions and the adoption of smart working strategies such as online trade or the 
fashion sector, were able to stem the direct impact of the emergency or even profit 
from it.
The Italian National Institute of Statistics in May 2020 has provided a wide 
range of data and information about the positioning and contribution of the sectors 
within the Italian production system.
The database is based on the Extended Statistical Register on Economic 
Performance of Enterprises (Frame-SBS), which contains individual data on all 
industrial and service enterprises active in the country (about 4.4 million units), 
supplemented with additional statistical registers that provide detailed information 
on the characteristics of the employment, as well as import and export enter-
prises. The data have been further integrated with indicators taken from Italian 
Accounting.
Considering the enterprises that are part of the universe of reference of the 
system of Structural Business Statistics (SBS), those that from May 4 are operating 
in sectors still formally suspended are about 800 thousand (19.1% of the total), with 
an employment weight of 15.7% on the total of the sectors of industry and market 
services (excluding the financial sector) [22].
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By revising and analyzing the Istat dataset updated in May 2020 [23] with regard 
to the pandemic, it can be observed in the Figure 1 below that the unavailability of 
manpower has most directly affected the following sectors in percentage terms:
1. Other mining and quarrying activities; creative, artistic and entertainment 
activities; travel agency, tour operator and reservation services and related 
activities; libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities; rental and 
operative leasing activities; real estate activities; activities concerning lotter-
ies, betting, gambling houses; Sports, entertainment and leisure activities; 
construction of buildings; Mining of metal ores; Manufacture of other trans-
port equipment; Manufacture of leather and related products; Manufacture of 
motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; Manufacture of furniture; Tobacco 
industry; Metallurgy; Advertising and market research: 100%
2. Manufacture of clothing, manufacture of leather and fur articles: 98,48%
3. Manufacture of fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment): 
93,98%
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5. Food service activities: 90,91%
6. Manufacture of machinery and equipment NCA: 89,48%
7. Textile industries: 86,77%
8. Other personal service activities: 83,46%
9. Wholesale trade (except of motor vehicles and motorcycles): 67,23%
10. Manufacture of rubber and plastic products: 63,67%.
3.2 Approaches to supply chain what if analysis: dependencies trees
Considering the analyses and remediation plans structured to protect the SCC, it 
is possible to structure What If models oriented to predict the consequences linked 
to the lack of a supply.
In relation to the manpower issue, for example, it is possible to structure time-
oriented models that consider the negative effects of the manpower.
The Domino Effect methodology applied to manpower aims to study and 
quantify the consequences of a negative event that causes a lack of personnel and/
or supply chain. The model is configured as a visualization of the propagation over 
time of the negative effects caused by the unavailability of a certain percentage of 
company personnel.
Such a predictive model can allow the decision maker to simulate different crisis 
scenarios resulting from the loss of personnel based on the formal organizational 
structure of the company. In order for the model to be effective, however, it will 
be essential to feed the model and the collection of information starting from the 
analysis of the organizational chart and the company function chart.
Information is needed that can be traced back to the following organizational  
areas:
• Administration (ADM)
• Actors in charge of Crisis Management (CM)
• Functions that have relationships with critical suppliers (SUP)
• Business (BSS)
• Commercial (COM).
The holistic evolution of this model consists in describing the interdependencies 
between different sectors starting from the simulation of a disservice concerning a 
sector. The generic example below can be applied to a single reality in order to under-
stand what long-term effects the lack of manpower, considered as a distinguished 
sector, could have on the operational continuity of the organization itself (Figure 2).
The severity of the dependency corresponds to the extent to which the Quality 
of Service (QoS) perceived by the user is deteriorated. Depending on the item, the 
degradation can be measured by the variation of some specific parameters (cover-
age, signal reception, delivery time, etc.) with respect to the normal QoS values. In 
general, the measures that allow to characterize the QoS can be traced back to the 
general concepts of availability and capacity: the quality with which the service is 
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provided can be described by quantifying the quantity of items provided in com-
parison to the demand and the time in which the service is actually available. The 
choice of the temporal moments in which to sample the phenomenon varies accord-
ing to the item represented.
Metrics commonly agreed to in these cases include: Abandonment Rate; 
ASA (Average Speed to Answer); TSF (Time Service Factor); FCR (First-Call 
Resolution); TAT (Turn-Around Time); TRT (total resolution time); MTTR (Mean 
Time To Recover).
Starting from the elaboration of matrices that consider dependency relations, to 
represent a domino effect map it is necessary to apply a “filter” based on the degra-
dation level of the service. an item will be considered compromised (and therefore 
will be represented in the domino effect map) only if the QoS degradation will be 
higher than a certain threshold, so the service is not considered acceptable (outage).
Various methods are described in the literature to perform this assessment. In 
general, the most common approaches consist in identifying some indicators that 
describe the various aspects of the consequences caused by an out of service event.
These indicators can fall into the following categories:
• number of people (evaluated in terms of people impacted by the disruption)
• economic damage (assessed in terms of the extent of economic losses and/or 
deterioration of products or services)
• effects on public opinion (assessed in terms of impact on public confidence, 
physical suffering, and disruption of daily life).
Simulation of interdependencies and graph-based model to understand critical 
infrastructure interdependencies are proposed in literature [24–27].
Figure 2. 
Manpower cascading effect on organizational areas.
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The graphical output here proposed (Figure 3) from the described model con-
sists of dependency trees, time-oriented, that describe the collapse of the internal 
structure of an organization following the manpower “sector” unavailability. This 
model can be applied to a single organization based on its SC analysis starting 
considering one or more products and services sectors.
By re-analyzing the ISTAT indices and considering the main sectors activated 
by the sectors impacted by the manpower shortage, it is possible to identify which 
related sectors have been most impacted by service interruptions than those 
listed above.
The sectors impacted indirectly by the shortage of manpower compared with the 
interruptions of those impacted directly are as follows:
• Rental and management of owned or leased properties
• Legal and accounting activities
• Road freight transport, removal and pipeline transport
• Financial service activities (except insurance and pension funding)
• Wholesale
• Manufacture of fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment)
As we can see in Figure 4, some sectors such as Financial Services Activities 
that did not undergo significant effects during the first phase of the lockdown, are 
subject to an indirect impact due to the activity suspension of their main suppliers.
3.3 Augustus method and its application by the Italian civil protection
The Augustus method can be considered as another concrete approaches to 
Critical Infrastructure protection.
The Method is a tool used by the Civil Protection Department of the Italian 
Republic for emergency planning. The Augustus Method was created in order to 
equip the Italian Civil Protection Service with a unified strategy for planning the 
Civil Protection assistance at various levels of competence.
Figure 3. 
Manpower dependency tree.
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This method is named after the Roman Emperor Augustus (27 B.C. to 14 A.D.), 
who affirmed that: “The value of planning decreases with the complexity of the state 
of things.” In detail, Augustus stated that it is impossible to plan a strategy in the 
smallest detail, because the event when it happens will always present in a different 
way. The Augustus Method is generated from the need to harmonize the directions 
of emergency planning.
This approach to the complexity of modern reality was structured and adapted 
by Elvezio Galanti, who considers the “emergency” (a public situation of particular 
difficulty and danger) an “organism” with its own life and composed by physi-
ological functions (endocrine system, cardiology, etc.), each one specialized in its 
own field in which normally carries out its ordinary activity. In the context of civil 
protection, the “organism” is defined as the territory in which they normally act, 
and each one because of its specific functions (municipal, regional, health, trans-
port, etc.). In the event of a disaster, these activities must all work together and in 
synergy.
The Augustus Methodology highlights, therefore, a fundamental aspect of the 
functioning of the Italian Civil Protection: its systemic nature. A complex apparatus 
made up of different elements and different organizations, resulting from the 
functioning of different systems in interaction with each other and with the other 
organizational systems [28].
In the preventive design phase, the Civil Protection, first of all, must work to 
collect information (time of occurrence of an event, geological conformation, 
productive fabric, urban fabric, etc.), then it must proceed with basic examina-
tions (hazard analysis, vulnerability analysis, etc.) and finally a first diagnosis will 
be made (scenario, i.e. what I expect to happen) and for this reason, facilities will 
be arranged (monitoring networks, cleaning of riverbeds, seismic adaptation of 
structures, etc.).
In the absence or in the impossibility of activating these protocols, minimum 
measures of confrontation will be taken through the constitution of a “resilient cell” 
to manage the “big 5”, i.e. five macro-areas in which the operational approach is 
divided into “acute emergency”. These are:
1. identification of sites per control room;
2. entry points for expected rescue;
3. reception areas and first assistance to the population;
Figure 4. 
Index of indirect impact on SCC for other sectors not highly affected by unavailability of manpower.
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4. identification of proximity sites to coordinate local interventions;
5. assistance to the population (health and management of any temporary camps 
for reception and stay).
In the “acute” emergency scenario the Augustus Method becomes a good 
practice to manage the situation through the identification of 14 basic support 
 functions, or support, that match all the competent and specific institutional 
figures for each function at territorial level and that contribute to its ordinary and 
extraordinary functioning. These functions are usually involved during the emer-
gency itself, while in the study phases prior to the emergency, such as forecasting 
and prevention, they are deactivated and delivered to their specific and ordinary 
institutional functioning. These functions are: F 1 - Technology and planning; F 2 -  
Health, social and veterinary assistance; F 3 - Mass-media and information; 
F 4 - Volunteering; F 5 - Materials and means; F 6 - Transport, traffic and roads; 
F 7 - Telecommunications; F 8 - Essential services; F 9 - Census of damage to 
persons and property; F 10 - Operational facilities; F 11 - Local authorities; F 12 - 
Hazardous materials; F 13 - Assistance to the population; F 14 - Coordination of 
operational centres.
The design of all coordinated activities and procedures of Civil Protection 
to respond to any disaster event that is expected in a specific territory is called 
“Emergency Plan”. The Emergency Plan must be implemented:
1. Forecasting and Prevention Programs
2. Information related to:





Therefore, it is necessary to represent graphically the information necessary for 
the characterization of possible risk scenarios for the implementation of interven-
tion strategies for the rescue and management of the emergency, rationalizing and 
targeting the use of men and means.
According to the Method, the following conditions determine the success of a 
civil protection operation [29]:
• unitary direction: the unitary direction of emergency operations is imple-
mented through the coordination of a complex system and not in a sectoral 
vision of the intervention.
• communication: constant exchange of information between the central and 
peripheral Civil Protection system.
• resources: rational and timely use of the resources really available and the 
availability of the men and means suitable for intervention.
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The Emergency Plan structured according to the Augustus Method must be able 
to answer the following questions:
• what calamitous events may reasonably affect the municipality?
• which people, facilities and services will be affected or damaged?
• what operational organization is necessary to minimize the effects of the event 
with particular attention to the protection of human life?
• to whom are the different responsibilities at the various levels of command and 
control for emergency management assigned?
To satisfy these needs, it is first of all necessary to define the risk scenarios 
on the basis of the vulnerability of the portion of the territory concerned (areas, 
population involved, damaged structures, etc.) in order to have a global and reliable 
picture of the expected event and therefore to be able to dimension in advance the 
operational response necessary to overcome the disaster with particular attention 
to the protection of human life (how many firefighters, how many volunteers, 
which command and control structures, which roads or escape routes, which shelter 
structures, health areas, etc.).
The Emergency Plan is therefore a working tool calibrated on a likely situation 
based on scientific knowledge of the state of risk of the territory, which can be 
updated and integrated with reference to the list of men and means, but especially 
when new knowledge is acquired on the conditions of risk involving different 
assessments of the scenarios, or even when new or additional monitoring and warn-
ing systems to the population are available [30].
On the provincial level, the Emergency Plan will identify, at an inter-municipal 
or provincial scale: on the one side the situations that can configure a more exten-
sive emergency of the single municipality, on the other side the situations, even 
localized, of greater risk, pointing out, when necessary, the need for an in-depth 
study of some aspects related to the Municipal scale.
On municipal level, a more detailed level of information is needed to allow 
the operators of the various components of the Civil Protection to have a refer-
ence framework corresponding to the size of the expected event, the population 
involved, the alternative road system, possible escape routes, waiting areas, shelter, 
storage areas and so on. Considering that the risk present in a given territory 
may refer to different types of events (floods, earthquakes, landslides, etc.), the 
Emergency Plan must provide for one or more “risk scenarios”, which must or may 
correspond to different types of intervention.
The Italian Civil Protection assumes primary and decisive roles on the insti-
tutional scene of civil protection in Italy. This body sums up three fundamental 
structures at national level:
• the Civil Protection Department at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers
• the General Directorate of Civil Protection and Firefighting Services at the 
Ministry of the Interior
• the National Seismic Service at the Department of National Technical Services 
(currently dependent on the Ministry of Public Works).
The Civil Protection plays a key role in the management of national emergen-
cies but not only: the possibility of being activated by the Prefect (Prefetto) for 
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emergencies and in particular cases also for events at local level, makes the Civil 
Protection an entity that can operate de facto across the board. The Prefect is the 
cornerstone of the command and coordination structure of the civil protection 
operational system.
Another key player is represented by the Mayor. He is the determining element 
in the operational chain of civil protection at municipal level in the assumption of 
all responsibilities related to civil protection tasks: from the preventive organization 
of control and monitoring activities to the adoption of emergency measures aimed 
primarily at safeguarding human life.
It is appropriate, at this point, to make one final consideration: the Emergency 
Plan is drawn up in any case on the basis of the scientific knowledge possessed at 
the time of writing, without waiting for studies in progress or future assignments 
or improvements. An “expeditious” plan, even if imprecise and precautionary, is 
better than no plan at all. As soon as possible, the Emergency Plan will be reviewed, 
improved, and completed with more data and more scientific bases.
The key concept of contingency planning is to try to predict all possible vari-
ables, however, it is necessary to be aware that it will always be possible, in any 
emergency, to face something unforeseen.
3.4 The Italian civil protection strategy for the management of the 2020 crisis
The coordination of the members of the National Service of Civil Protection is 
happening according to the provisions of the Augustus Method thanks to the syn-
chronism of the representatives of each operational function (Health, Volunteering, 
Telecommunications, etc..) to interact directly with each other.
The intervention model adopted by civil protection for the management of the 
epidemiological emergency [31] based on the definition of the chain of command 
and control, the communication flow and the procedures to be activated in relation 
to the emergency state determined by the spread of the pandemic.
The chain of command and control includes the following levels of coordination:
• National level: the Head of the Civil Protection Department ensures the coordi-
nation of the necessary interventions, making use of the Department, the com-
ponents, and operational structures of the National Civil Protection Service, as 
well as implementing entities. At the Department of Civil Protection is active 
the Civil Protection Operational Committee, with the task of ensuring the 
contribution and support of the National Civil Protection System on the basis 
of the health indications defined by the Ministry of Health, which makes use 
of the ISS (Istituto Superiore Sanità) and the Scientific Technical Committee 
specifically established with the OCDPC 630/2020 at the Department.
• Regional level: at all Regions must be activated a regional crisis unit, which oper-
ates in close connection with the SOR - Regional Operations Room, which must 
provide for the participation of the Regional Health Contact, which operates in 
connection with the Health Director of the local health agencies, and in constant 
contact with a representative of the Chief Prefecture, in order to ensure the 
connection with the other Prefectures - UTG of the regional territory.
• Provincial level: in the provinces in which at least one person is positive for 
whom the source of transmission is unknown or in any case where there is a 
case not attributable to a person from an area already affected by the virus, as 
provided by art. 1, paragraph 1 of Decree-Law no. 6 of 23.02.2020, the Prefect or 
his delegate provides for the activation of the CCS - Rescue Coordination Centre
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• Municipal level: in the municipalities or areas in which at least one person is 
positive for whom the source of transmission is unknown or in any case where 
there is a case not attributable to a person from an area already affected by the 
aforementioned virus, as provided by art. 1 paragraph 1 of Decree-Law no. 
6 of 23.02.2020, the Mayor or his delegate provides for the activation of the 
Municipal Operations Centre - COC of the municipality involved and neigh-
boring municipalities in order to implement possible preventive actions.
Therefore, in order to cope with the pandemic and in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Augustus Method, collaborative decision-making processes have been 
initiated in real time in the operational rooms of the various levels such as:
• Centro Coordinamento dei Soccorsi (CCS) - Rescue Coordination Centre
• Centro Operativo Comunale (COC) - Municipal Operations Centre
• Centro Operativo Misto (COM) - Mixed Operations Centre.
The CCS is the main body at provincial level and is chaired by the Prefect or his 
delegate. By COC is meant the Municipal Operations Centre, responsible for the 
activities at municipal-local level, whose maximum point of reference is the Mayor 
or his delegate (Law 225/1992 - Art. 15). Finally, the COM is the Mixed Operations 
Centre. They can be more than one and set up ad hoc to be as close as possible to the 
place of the event.
Originally established as emergency operational centres (i.e. support and opera-
tional coordination structures set up and organized exclusively in the full manage-
ment phase of the emergency following catastrophic events), over time the term has 
moved to a broader interpretation of the term which also involves structures and 
organizational divisions of one or more local administrations in the construction 
of the local civil protection system as well as emergency planning activities to be 
carried out in ordinary time.
In this emergency caused by the pandemic, a key role is played by the COC, 
which have been activated in many Italian municipalities [32].
Specifically, the Mayor makes use of the COC to ensure the direction and 
coordination of rescue and assistance services to the population within his 
municipal territory in relation to the declaration of the state of emergency issued 
by the Italian Government. The choice of the location of this Centre must be in 
earthquake-proof structures, in areas with easy access and not vulnerable to any 
kind of risk. These facilities must be equipped with a square of enough size to 
accommodate heavy vehicles and anything else needed in a state of emergency. 
The COC is responsible for the decision-making levels of the entire municipal 
structure, summarized in the trade union responsibilities referred to in the previ-
ous paragraphs; as a rule, the decision-making level is taken by the Mayor who, 
through a municipal civil protection system, identifies the actions and strategies 
necessary to try to keep the infection curve and morbidity index under control. 
The COC operates in a place of coordination called “operations room” where all the 
news related to the event converge and where decisions are taken to overcome it. 
In many municipalities, the COC has been activated by the Mayor as an immediate 
consequence of the increase in infections within the national territory, and not 
necessarily in the municipal one, and it will remain operational until the resolution 
of the pandemic crisis [33].
According to the Civil Protection Operational Measures for the manage-
ment of the epidemiological emergency [31] actions and operational measures 
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identified for each level of coordination, without prejudice to the provisions 
issued by the Ministry of Health, are as follows:
• information to the population
• activation of local volunteering, in connection with the levels of coordination 
above
• organization of actions at the municipal level, in connection with the regional 
and provincial level, actions to ensure the continuity of essential services, as 
well as the collection of waste in areas affected, or that may be affected, by 
urgent measures of containment
• organization of actions at the municipal level, in connection with what has 
been prepared at the regional level, actions aimed at ensuring the continuity of 
the supply of basic necessities (including fuel supplies) in the areas concerned, 
or that could be affected by urgent containment measures;
• planning, or possible activation, of the actions of assistance to the population 
of the municipalities concerned, or that could be affected by urgent contain-
ment measures
• planning and organization of home care services for persons in home quaran-
tine (e.g., basic necessities, medicines, pre-packaged meals…), possibly carried 
out by personnel of volunteer organizations, appropriately trained.
At this point, it can be stated that the success of a civil protection operation can 
be achieved if three parameters are satisfied: coordination, communication, and 
resource management.
4. Conclusion
As with any crisis management strategy, resilience strategies must be planned 
and prepared during the “peace” period and then implemented, appropriately 
adapted, during crisis situations. The variable structure, and a proactive response, 
is what succeeds in giving us a continuity and dealing successfully with the 
complexity.
Labor shortages directly affected all those sectors that had to close due to the 
impossibility to convert their business using smart working. Some activities, 
although part of sectors not directly involved in the lockdown, were indirectly 
affected by labor shortages caused by the inability of seasonal and commuting staff 
to move. Finally, the indirect repercussions that have affected those activities that, 
while remaining operational, have suffered significant economic repercussions due to 
the interruption of their supply chain caused by the shortage of labor in other sectors.
To be considered in the degree of dependence that an organization might have 
on its suppliers, beyond its intrinsic resilience, is the degree of flexibility applicable 
to relations with the various suppliers.
To plan the SCCM it will be necessary to carry out Impact Analysis activities 
with the individual suppliers involved, distinguishing critical suppliers from 
non-critical suppliers. For all relationships with critical suppliers continuity can be 
determined by identifying a SCCM strategy to be agreed transparently with these 
suppliers. Some strategic approaches may be:
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• Reducing dependence on a supplier: direct engagement of alternative suppliers 
for a given service; increasing on-site stock holding; establishing alternative 
solutions.
• Increased resilience: mitigation of losses; identification of a set of alternative 
suppliers; establishing mutual support policies with competitors.
• Working with suppliers: creating partnerships with suppliers; setting 
 performance standards (including through SLAs); monitoring and dealing 
with suppliers to increase their resilience; including SCCM requirements in 
supplier contracts.
The adoption of these measures will result in increasing control over the value 
chain in relation to an organization. In particular, the analysis carried out on the 
supplier chain gives visibility to the mapping of the interdependencies between the 
different sectors enabling an analysis that goes beyond the single organization.
Therefore, maximum flexibility and, at the same time, the ability to create the 
preconditions (e.g. through exercises) is needed to ensure that the best conditions 
for success are in place in these cases as well.
Moreover, most of all, the 2020 crisis confirmed the relevance of the 
human factor.
The Italian case is an example of how the set of private initiatives, the support of 
adequate policies of incentives and support from the State, together with a strong 
sense of solidarity with the population, can represent a positive reaction to a nega-
tive event, and that business strategies oriented towards business continuity are the 
basis for the development of resilience in the productive sector, and the resilience of 
the Critical Infrastructures.
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